Abstract: A novel authentication protocol for teleconference service is proposed. The main features of the proposed protocol include identity anonymity, one-time Pseudonym Identity (PID) renewal and location intracability. Identity anonymity is achieved by concealing the real identity of a mobile conferee in a prearranged PID. One-time PID Renewal mechanism, in which the mobile conferee's PID is frequently updated communicating with the network centre, is introduced to offer location intracability. It is shown that the security has been significantly enhanced, while the computation complexity is similar to the existing ones appeared in the literature.
Introduction
Mobile teleconference is a synchronous collaboration session, in which conferees at remote locations cooperate with an interactive procedure, for example, a board meeting, a task force or a scientific symposium through wireless communications. When a conference chair holds a mobile teleconference, all conferees are required to connect to a centre node, called a Network Center (NC), via wireless access network. The NC receives messages from conferees, processes them in an appropriate way and then sends the results to conferees.
Privacy is very important to mobile teleconference. A secure conference service protocol for digital mobile networks has proposed by Hwang and Yang (1995) . The protocol can establish a session key for a valid user to hold a teleconference. A modified secure teleconference protocol, which allows an active participant to join or exit on-going conference, has been presented by Hwang (1999) . Both user authentication and session key distribution are simultaneously included in the conference protocol. The session key distribution uses a public key cryptosystem to simplify the communication between conferees and NC. However, the conferee's mobile device is required to use two cryptosystems, which is not friendly to the low computation power requirement. A simplified mechanism, called self-encryption, was given by Hwang and Chang (2003) , which not only decreases the computation complexity in Hwang (1999) , but also retains simple communications for the secure teleconference service. The self-encryption mechanism uses the plaintext as a long-term secret key to encrypt the corresponding cipher-text. The long-term secret key s i = f(ID i ) for its ith mobile user T i is maintained by NC, where f is a secret one-way hash function and ID i denotes the identity of the mobile user. The self-encryption mechanism operates as follows:
Step 1 A chairman T 1 initiates a conference and then: Here, ID ( 1, 2, , ) i i m = … represents the conferees' identity, t 1 denotes the timestamp, and s 1 is generated by NC, such as (ID ),
where f is a secret one-way function held by NC.
Step 2 On receiving message from T 1 , NC decrypts the encrypted data by using the long-term secret key s 1 , and then verifies whether s 1 is equal to 1 (ID ) f and the timestamp t 1 is within some reasonable range compared with its current time. If both are true, NC calls other mobile conferees ID ( 2, 3, ..., ) .
i i m =
Step 3 Every participant T i , for i = 2, 3,…, m, does the same as chairman ( , , ,PA) Q y R to ( 2, 3, , ) .
Here, Q, y and R are computed by 2 .
Step 5 Each participant i T obtains conference key C K as ( 2 )mod( )
where the session key r i is computed as 
E
Note that the self-encryption mechanism provides an implicit authentication (Steps 2 and 4). Once receiving message from T i , NC decrypts the encrypted data by using the long-term secret key s i . If the decrypted secret key s i is equal to (ID ), i f the identity of conferee T i is true.
However, the self-encryption mechanism cannot provide identity anonymity, and an intruder can easily obtain ID i by intercepting the messages. If the secret oneway function f is spied, the intruder could compute all the long-term shared keys s i and the cryptographic system would be promised. The disclosure of a user's identity will allow unauthorised entities to track his moving history and current location, which entails the violation of his privacy. Hence, the identity anonymity is one of the important factors that should be considered in mobile teleconference. On the other hand, the mechanism of issuing the session key to a new participant during a conference may cause that a participant who leaves right after the new participant joining the conference is still able to eavesdrop the conversation even when the session key is refreshed (Ng, 2001) .
In this paper, we propose a simple authentication protocol with anonymity property for mobile teleconference services based on the Secret Splitting principle (Schneier, 1996) . Secret splitting is a type of information-hidden technique, in which a message is divided into several components. The original message can be reconstructed if and only if the number of components gathered is equal or greater than the preset threshold. In the proposed protocol, the real identity of a mobile conferee is decomposed into a Pseudonym Identity (PID) used for transmission and a random number N, which is known by NC only, so that an intruder is unable to reconstruct the real identity from PID without the knowledge of N. In addition, to prevent the mobility of a particular mobile conferee from being traced, the PID is renewed frequently using proposed One-time PID Renewal mechanism. The conversation privacy is also guaranteed when participants join or leave the on-going teleconference meeting by properly renewing and re-distributing the conference session key.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the authentication protocol with anonymity for teleconference services is proposed. In Sections 3 and 4, the security and the performance analysis are presented, respectively, followed by the conclusion in Section 5.
The proposed authentication protocol with anonymity property
The proposed authentication protocol uses a simple secret splitting mechanism to provide the identity anonymity and prevent unauthorised entities from tracing a particular mobile user's roaming history and his current location. The security strength does not reply on the secrecy of the one-way function, so public one-way hash functions are used in the proposed protocol. We still retain the self-encryption mechanism in the proposed scheme, that is, the NC also maintains a long-term secret key (ID )
s f = for his conferee T i by using a one-way function f. By extracting the real identity ID i of user T i from PID i , we can further compute the shared key s i , which is used to encrypt the exchanged messages. However, we provide identity anonymity mechanism by using a Pseudonym Identity PID i for a mobile user T i instead of his real identity ID i . The Pseudonym Identity PID i is prearranged and distributed by NC in advance. And the mobile user T i stores PID i , which is only known to NC and himself.
Mutual Authentication Protocol (MAP)
When a user T i registers with NC, he submits his identity ID i to NC, whose identity is ID NC . NC generates an m-bits random number N i and keeps it secret. In order to prevent the exclusive search attack, m should be sufficiently large, for example, 128 bits or longer. NC computes a Pseudonym Identity PID i for T i as:
where '⊕' denotes bitwise XOR operation and h is a public strong one-way hash function. Then, NC delivers PID i to T i through a secure channel and NC records the mapping relation of PID i and (PID )
in distributed database servers. By this secret-splitting mechanism, we can conceal the real identity ID i in PID i and provide identity anonymity for T i while keeping the algorithm simple.
In the following, we describe the proposed authentication protocol according to the order of message exchange and also discuss the security goals, which can be achieved during the execution of each protocol message (see Figure 1) .
Step 1 E t s r to NC.
Here, PID ( 1,2, ,
Step 2 On receiving the message from T 1 , NC retrieves the corresponding N 1 of mobile conferee T 1 by searching the PID i i N ↔ mapping table. NC derives the real identity of mobile conferee T 1 by computing ( ) Step 
( )
where K c is the session key and Step 5 Each participant T i obtains ( 2 )mod( )
Then T i verifies the validity of K c by checking whether PA is equal to
Dynamic participant mechanism
To assure the freshness of session key K c , when a participant wants to exit an in-process teleconference, NC must change the session key K c and re-compute PI.
Member join: when a participant Member quit: when a participant T j leaves a conference that is already in-process, the renewing procedures for session key K c are described as follows.
Step 1 NC selects a new session key ' C K and further calculates PI′ and PA′ as follows 
Pseudonym Identity Renewal Protocol
Though in previous MAP scheme we provide an identity anonymity mechanism by using a Pseudonym Identity PID i for a mobile conferee T i instead of his real identity ID i , there are still some security issues to be consider. For example, even when the mobile conferee T i never reveals his identity ID i to parties other than NC, he does reveal his long-term Pseudonym Identity PID i during mutual authentication in MAP. Therefore, illegal parties can still track a conferee's location by his long-term PID i , although they have no way to extract the real identity ID i . The goal of Pseudonym Identity Renewal Protocol (PIRP) protocol is to renew a new PID for a mobile conferee. We introduce a new mechanism called 'One-time Pseudonym Identity Renewal'. This new feature allows mobile conferee to renew his PID frequently and reduces the risk that he uses a compromised PID to communicate with NC.
Suppose that a mobile conferee T i is required to renew his Pseudonym Identity PID i, j-1 with NC for the jth time, he can obtain the new PID i, j according to the steps shown in Figure 2 . 
As shown in Figure 2 , the new Pseudonym Identity PID i, j is calculated as follows. 
Evidently, it will vary in each pseudonym identity renewal because of the two random number r i, j and r NC, j . Note that PID i, 0 of mobile conferee T i is set as the original Pseudonym Identity PID i in MAP phase, that is, ,0 PID PID .
In the following, we describe this sub-protocol according to the order of message exchanges in Figure 2 .
Step 1 Step 4 Next, we shall analyse the security of this protocol. The performance comparison between our protocol and the one in Hwang and Chang (2003) scheme will be described in the later section.
Security analysis
Generally, there are five basic security requirements for secure teleconference services (Hwang, 1999): 4 Prevention of fraud by ensuring that mobile conferees and NC are authentic, that is, there is a mutual authentication mechanism between NC and a mobile conferee.
5 Secure dynamic participation, so that any active participant can join or leave a teleconference while assuring the freshness of conference session key.
Next we analyse the security of our proposed protocol to see whether these security requirements have been satisfied.
Identity anonymity and intracability analysis
The security requirement for concealing participants' location information is achieved by introducing a simple identity anonymity mechanism. This feature makes an intruder unable to trace a particular mobile user's location by intercepting the conversation. Our scheme provides identity anonymity in all procedures by replacing conferees' real identity with a PID. h N = ⊕ ⊕ and it is impossible for a tracker to extract the real identity ID i from the transmitted messages and then trace the location of a mobile targeted user. Since each conferee's PID i is computed using unique N i , the legitimate conferee T i cannot compute another conferee T k 's ID k by intercepting PID k and impersonate T k .
Case 2 In PIRP phase, the identity anonymity is guaranteed by the similar mechanism. That is, the conferee T i substitutes the Pseudonym Identity PID i, j with his real identity ID i , where the Pseudonym Identity PID i,j is computed as Although location-awareness services and applications will become more popular in the future; the importance of protecting information about participants' locations would not be decreasing, accordingly, especially considering such confidential applications in military environment. It seems that the identity anonymity may contradict with the location-awareness services and applications. Actually, by introducing some other mechanisms, such as the key escrow or recovery scheme (Abe and Kanda, 2002; Gonzáles Nieto et al., 2002) , we can still provide the location-awareness services as well as safeguard the privacy of a participant's location information with the aid of identity anonymity mechanism.
Prevention of relaying attacking
A replaying attack is a method that an intruder stores 'stale' intercepted messages and retransmits them at a later time. An efficient measure against a replaying attack is to introduce timestamp t and lifetime L into the transmitted messages and set an expected legal time interval ∆t for transmission delay.
All transmitted messages in each step of our scheme contain timestamps. According to the timestamp t and ∆t, the receiver can efficiently verify the validity of these messages by checking if i t t t − < ∆ is true, where t j is the timestamp of a message while t is current time when it is received. If this inequality holds, the message is valid. Otherwise, NC regards this message as a replaying message. By this mechanism, a replaying attack can be avoided.
Privacy of conferee conversation content
Evidently, the privacy of conferee conversation content in our scheme is guaranteed. Once the valid participants hold the session key K c , the conversation of the conference content will be encrypted by K c .
Hence, any intruder cannot know the conversation content without knowing the session key K c . To obtain conference session key K c , an intruder must first obtain the private random r i and then use it to calculate K c , as in Equation (9).
However, in our scheme, the random ( 1,2, , )
is only generated secretly by conferee T i . Nobody except T i himself and NC knows the random r i . Therefore, even though all of the messages 
Prevention of fraud
In order to prevent fraud, the NC and conferees should be authenticated with each other. This requires that our scheme provide mutual authentication mechanism between NC and each conferee.
Firstly, assume that we consider the following impersonation attack scenarios in MAP protocol. This security requirement can be achieved by verifying the correctness of the conferee's identity ID i and his secret key s i .
Case 1 An intruder has no way to impersonate NC to cheat conferee T i . Since the shared key s i is only known to conferee T i and NC, and an intruder cannot send conferee T i the valid response { , , , PA} Q y R , which is generated by NC. Once each participant T i receives the message { , , , PA} Q y R in Figure 1 , he can compute ( 2 )mod( ) 
Dynamic participant mechanism
Our proposed protocol meets the requirement of secure dynamic participation, since the key distribution mechanism in our scheme can update the session key K c when a member joins or leaves the in-process conference. As described in Section 2, NC can assure the freshness of conference session key K c by changing the session key K c , re-computing PI, and then re-distributing the requisite updating messages to corresponding conferees.
Performance analysis
The portable devices usually have low power and computation capacity, so it is impractical to implement certain complex cryptography algorithms which require high computation complexity in portable devices. There are two performance factors to be considered in wireless environment. Firstly, the low computational power of mobile devices should be a concern, which means a security protocol requiring heavy computation on the mobile device is not feasible (Ng and Mitchell, 2004; Shim, 2003; Wong and Chan, 2001) . Secondly, since the bandwidth is lower and the channel error is higher in wireless networks than that in wired networks, the security protocols should be designed to minimise the message size and the number of message exchanges.
The performance comparison between our protocol and the one in Hwang and Chang (2003) scheme is shown in Table 1 . We mainly compare the number of hash operations, exponentiation operations, symmetric encryption/decryption operations and the number of transmissions (message exchanges) in the two protocols. Table 1 Performance comparison
Comparison item

Hwang and Chang protocol
Our protocol Note that the rows in shadow show the differences between them. Though one Hash operation (computing the long-term shared secret key s i ) is added in our scheme, we obtain the following extra security features:
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we propose a novel authentication protocol with anonymity property for teleconference services to resolve the security issues in previous teleconference protocols. Two new mechanisms are introduced in our protocols: identity anonymity and one-time pseudonym identity renewal. For offering anonymity, we conceal the real identity of a mobile conferee in a prearranged PID by utilising the secret-splitting principle. In order to provide location intracability, one-time pseudonym identity renewal mechanism is introduced. We utilise iterative algorithm to update PID frequently and thus reduce the risk that a conferee uses a compromised PID to communicate with NC. The performance comparisons show that though we achieve such new security features, the complexity of our protocols is similar to the one in the literature and the computation requirement for mobile device is quite low.
